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Why We Cannot Learn from Minimal Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
  
Philosophers of science have developed several accounts of how 
consideration of scientific models can prompt learning about real-world 
targets. In recent years, various authors advocated the thesis that 
consideration of so-called minimal models can prompt learning about 
such targets. In this paper, I draw on the philosophical literature on 
scientific modelling and on widely cited illustrations from economics 
and biology to argue that this thesis fails to withstand scrutiny. More 
specifically, I criticize leading proponents of such thesis for failing to 
explicate in virtue of what properties or features minimal models 
supposedly prompt learning and for substantially overstating the 
epistemic import of minimal models. I then examine and refute several 
arguments one may put forward to demonstrate that consideration of 
minimal models can prompt learning about real-world targets. In doing 
so, I illustrate the implications of my critique for the wider debate on 
the epistemology of scientific modelling. 
 
 
Keywords: Scientific Modelling; Minimal Models; Representation; 
Learning; Epistemology of Modelling. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Philosophers of science have developed a number of accounts of how 
consideration of scientific models can prompt learning about real-world 
targets (see e.g. Cartwright, 1999 and 2009, Mäki, 2005 and 2009, 
Morgan, 1999 and 2001, and Sugden, 2000 and 2009). These accounts 
offer dissimilar indications as to what conditions scientific models must 
satisfy to prompt learning about such targets. Two clusters of accounts 
are usefully contrasted in this context. On the one hand, some focus on 
the diverse representational functions served by models and allege that 
consideration of scientific models can prompt learning about real-world 
targets provided that these models satisfy specific criteria of 
representational adequacy (see e.g. van Fraassen, 1980, and French, 
2003, on isomorphism; Giere, 2004, Teller, 2001, and Weisberg, 2012, 
on similarity; and Mäki, 1992 and 2009, on partial resemblance). On the 
other hand, others emphasize models’ suitability to serve as surrogate 
systems (see e.g. Suarez, 2004, and Swoyer, 1991) and maintain that 
highly idealized scientific models can prompt learning by providing 
means of conceptual exploration (see e.g. Hausman, 1992, ch.5) and 
credible ‘parallel worlds’ (see e.g. Sugden, 2000 and 2009) that do not 
aim to accurately represent any real-world target. 
 
These two clusters of accounts are not incompatible (see e.g. Mäki, 
2009, for an account of models as isolations and surrogate systems), but 
offer dissimilar indications as to what conditions scientific models must 
satisfy to prompt learning about real-world targets. In spite of these 
differences, all those accounts rest on the presupposition that 
consideration of scientific models can prompt learning about real-world 
targets only if some world-linking relations (e.g. similarity, 
isomorphism, resemblance) hold between such models and targets. As 
Morgan puts it, “if we want to use [a model] to learn about the world, 
the model needs to map onto the real world” (1999, 366; see also Mäki, 
1992 and 2009, and Sugden, 2000 and 2013, for similar remarks). 
 
In recent years, various authors (e.g. Grüne-Yanoff, 2009 and 2013a, 
and Knuuttila, 2009) have called this widespread presupposition into 
question. In their view, modellers can learn about real-world targets by 
consideration of so-called minimal models, i.e. models that “lack any 
similarity, isomorphism or resemblance relation to the world, [are] 
unconstrained by natural laws or structural identity, and [do not] isolate 
any real factors” (Grüne-Yanoff, 2009, 83). Consideration of minimal 
models is said to prompt learning in the sense that constructing, 
analysing and manipulating these models can justifiably “affect one’s 
confidence in necessity or impossibility hypotheses” about real-world 
targets without imposing any similarity, isomorphism, resemblance, etc. 
requirement between such models and targets (Grüne-Yanoff, 2009, 
81). Let us call the thesis that we can learn from minimal models in this 
sense ‘LMM’. 
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If correct, LMM would have far-reaching implications for scientific 
modellers, since necessity and impossibility hypotheses are advocated, 
discussed and tested in a vast range of disciplines (see e.g. Casini, 2014, 
and Knuuttila, 2009, on economic models; see also Batterman and Rice, 
2014, and Rohwer and Rice, 2013, on biological models). In this paper, 
I examine prominent calls in support of LMM and argue that such calls 
are vulnerable to severe objections. I then draw on often-quoted 
examples of putative learning from minimal models to demonstrate that 
LMM itself substantially overstates the epistemic import of such 
models. More specifically, I shall argue that contra LMM, 
consideration of minimal models cannot prompt learning about real-
world targets unless one supplements these models with additional 
information or presuppositions concerning such targets. 
 
My critique of LMM, which qualifies and extends a preliminary work 
on the epistemology of minimal models (Fumagalli, 2015), proceeds as 
follows. In Section 1, I outline recent calls in support of LMM and 
criticize the proponents of LMM for failing to specify in virtue of what 
properties or features minimal models can supposedly prompt learning 
about real-world targets. In Section 2, I draw on widely cited 
illustrations from economics and biology to argue that consideration of 
minimal models cannot per se prompt learning about such targets. In 
particular, I aim to demonstrate that LMM falls prey to the following 
dilemma. On the one hand, truly minimal models - i.e. models that are 
minimal in the sense indicated by LMM - lack the evidential and 
epistemic resources to prompt learning about real-world targets. On the 
other hand, several models that prima facie seem minimal in the sense 
indicated by LMM can prompt learning about real-world targets, but 
succeed in doing so only if supplemented with additional information or 
presuppositions about such targets. In Section 3, I examine and refute 
three arguments one may put forward to defend LMM against my 
critique. More specifically, I shall consider in turn the argument from 
how-possibly explanations, the argument from clusters of models, and 
the argument from heuristic applications. In doing so, I illustrate how 
my critique of LMM bears on the wider debate on the epistemology of 
scientific modelling. 
 
I shall expand in the following sections on the main reasons why I think 
that LMM fails to withstand scrutiny. For now, it suffices to note that 
my critique of LMM is not intended to suggest - and by no means 
implies - that building and manipulating minimal models is a futile 
modelling exercise. In particular, my critique allows that consideration 
of minimal models may provide epistemically informative insights 
concerning the possible worlds posited by these models. Still, it 
challenges the proponents of LMM to both specify in virtue of what 
properties or features minimal models can prompt learning about real-
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world targets and identify cases where consideration of these models 
prompts such learning.1 
 
The expression ‘minimal model’ has been employed in dissimilar 
senses by the philosophers and the practitioners of different disciplines 
(e.g. ecology, set theory, theoretical physics). Two uses of ‘minimal 
model’ besides the one adopted by Grüne-Yanoff (2009) are popular 
among scientific modellers. Some employ this expression to indicate 
models that include only “those factors that make a difference to the 
occurrence and essential character of [the investigated phenomena]” 
(Weisberg, 2007a, 642). Others, instead, speak of ‘minimal models’ to 
refer to caricatures that capture only the purportedly universal and 
repeatable features of their targets (see e.g. Batterman, 2002, and 
Goldenfeld, 1992) and may be used to show why targets “that are 
heterogeneous at smaller scales […] all display the same large-scale 
behavior” (Batterman and Rice, 2014, 349-350). 
 
Below I shall employ the expression ‘minimal model’ in the sense 
indicated at p.2 unless specified otherwise. Moreover, I shall devote 
particular attention to Grüne-Yanoff’s (2009) defence of LMM, since I 
regard it as the most detailed and widely cited case for this thesis (see 
e.g. Cartwright, 2009, de Donato Rodriguez and Zamora Bonilla, 2009, 
and Sugden, 2009 and 2013). Still, I shall expand in various passages 
on how my critique of LMM bears on other calls for the possibility of 
learning from minimal models, including calls that draw on less 
restrictive characterizations of ‘minimal model’ than the 
characterization underlying LMM (see e.g. the discussion in Section 1; 
see also footnote no.11, on Rohwer and Rice, 2013, and footnote no.13, 
on Batterman and Rice, 2014).2 
                                                          
1  I employ the expression ‘possible worlds’ broadly to indicate the 
hypothetical, imaginary, or counterfactual scenarios and states of affairs that 
are posited by specific models. My broad use of this expression covers what 
other authors (e.g. Morgan, 2001, and Sugden, 2000) have called ‘model 
worlds’ and ‘worlds of the model’. Also, I speak of ‘properties’ and ‘features’ 
- as opposed to ‘property’ and ‘feature’ - to allow for the possibility that 
distinct properties and features enable learning in different modelling contexts. 
I shall comment on this context-dependency and its implications for the merits 
of LMM in Section 1. 
2  I shall occasionally state that minimal models ‘are assumed to lack any 
similarity, isomorphism, resemblance, etc. relation’ to real-world targets as an 
abbreviation for the characterization of ‘minimal models’ reported in the text. 
The proponents of LMM (e.g. Grüne-Yanoff, 2009, 84) occasionally hint at a 
broader characterization of ‘minimal model’, according to which the set of 
minimal models includes both models that actually lack any similarity, 
isomorphism, resemblance, etc. relation to real-world targets and models for 
which no relation of similarity, isomorphism, resemblance, etc. to specific 
real-world targets has been determined by modellers. I shall expand in Section 
1 on the differences between distinct characterizations of ‘minimal model’ and 
the implications of such differences for the merits of LMM. For now, I rely on 
the narrower characterization reported in the text both because the proponents 
of LMM repeatedly employ this characterization to single out minimal models 
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1.  In virtue of what properties can minimal models prompt learning? 
 
 
LMM states that consideration of minimal models can prompt learning 
in the sense that constructing, analysing and manipulating these models 
can justifiably “affect one’s confidence in necessity or impossibility 
hypotheses” about real-world targets without imposing any similarity, 
isomorphism, resemblance, etc. requirement between such models and 
targets (Grüne-Yanoff, 2009, 81). Let us assume, for the sake of 
argument, that this constitutes an interesting and informative notion of 
learning.3 In virtue of what properties or features can minimal models 
supposedly prompt such learning? 
 
According to Grüne-Yanoff, “if we are to learn from a model”, then this 
model “must (1) present a relevant possibility that (2) contradicts an 
impossibility hypothesis that is held with sufficiently high confidence 
by the potential learners” (2009, 97). In his view, both of these 
conditions must be satisfied if a model is to prompt learning. More 
specifically, if condition (2) is not satisfied, then a model “merely 
shows the possibility of a state that no one believed to be impossible” 
and therefore “would not affect anyone’s confidence level” (ibid., 97). 
As to condition (1), that the possibility presented by a model is relevant 
can be established “with reference to natural laws covering this case or 
to similarity with empirical studies [or to] the credibility of the model” 
(ibid., 97). Now, neither ‘reference to natural laws’ nor ‘similarity with 
empirical studies’ can be established on the sole basis of information 
provided by minimal models. For such models are assumed to “lack any 
similarity, isomorphism or resemblance relation to the world, [be] 
unconstrained by natural laws or structural identity, and [isolate no] real 
factors” (Grüne-Yanoff, 2009, 83). Regarding the ‘credibility’ of 
models, the following points are worth emphasizing. 
 
Several accounts of models’ credibility have been developed in the 
philosophical literature on scientific modelling (see e.g. de Donato 
Rodriguez and Zamora Bonilla, 2009, and Mäki, 2009). The proponents 
of LMM often draw on Sugden’s (2000 and 2009) account of credibility 
on the alleged ground that this account provides “the most relevant 
arguments supporting the possibility of learning from minimal models” 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(see e.g. Grüne-Yanoff, 2009, 81-83) and because adopting the broader 
characterization would trivialize the issue whether we can learn from minimal 
models in the sense I explicate in Section 1. 
3 I am not concerned here with assessing the merits of this supposition. For 
present purposes, I note that not all scientific modellers speak of learning in 
the sense indicated by LMM. In particular, several authors (e.g. Morgan, 
1999) regard learning as more akin to acquiring novel information about one’s 
targets than to justifiably changing confidence in specific necessity or 
impossibility hypotheses about such targets. In what follows, I bracket these 
definitional concerns and examine what we can learn from minimal models in 
the sense indicated by LMM. I expand on different ways in which 
consideration of minimal models can allegedly prompt learning in Section 3. 
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(Grüne-Yanoff, 2009, 89). This does not prevent the proponents of 
LMM from criticizing specific tenets of Sugden’s account. For instance, 
Grüne-Yanoff doubts Sugden’s (2000, 19) claim that credible models 
can license inductive inferences to general hypotheses about the world 
by contending that a model’s credibility “depends on the intuitions and 
experiences elicited from particular situations” and that credibility 
judgements “are highly contingent on the specifics of the situation 
presented” (2009, 90). Even so, Grüne-Yanoff endorses both Sugden’s 
emphasis on credibility and his characterization of this notion. Let me 
expand on such characterization. 
 
On Sugden’s account, a model is credible only if it is logically 
consistent and the scenarios it envisions ‘could be real’, in the sense 
that they “cohere with common intuitions and experience” about the 
general laws and the causal factors operating in modellers’ real-world 
targets (Sugden, 2000, 26). That a model is credible in this sense 
indicates that such model is “compatible with what we know, or think 
we know, about […] the real world” and provides “a description of how 
the world could be” (Sugden, 2009, 18 and 24). However, it implies 
neither that the model is true (or approximately true, or probably true, 
or probably approximately true) nor that it resembles modellers’ real 
world-targets in specific respects. In this regard, the credibility of 
models closely resembles the credibility of so-called ‘realistic’ novels. 
As Sugden puts it, in a realistic novel “the author has to convince us 
that […] there could be people and places like those in the novel 
[Nonetheless] the characters and locations are imaginary [and] we do 
not demand that the events of the novel did happen, or even that they 
are simplified representations of what really happened” (2000, 25). 
 
Consideration of models that are credible in the sense indicated by 
Sugden may enable scientific modellers to acquire epistemically 
informative insights about the possible worlds posited by these models. 
Still, the mere fact that a model is credible in the sense indicated by 
Sugden falls short of implying that consideration of this model can per 
se prompt learning about real-world targets. After all, some credible 
models point to merely conceivable or logically possible scenarios, 
mechanisms, etc. that for all modellers know do not characterize the 
workings or the properties of any real-world target (see e.g. de Donato 
Rodriguez and Zamora Bonilla, 2009, on economic models assuming 
perfect information and infinitely divisible quantities, and Weisberg, 
2007b, on perpetual motion machines). Moreover, models often make 
idealizations that interpreted literally cannot be true, and yet are not 
deemed to lack credibility solely because they make these idealizations 
(see e.g. Sugden, 2009, on continuity assumptions in economic 
modelling). These observations, in turn, make it doubtful that 
consideration of credible models can per se prompt learning about real-
world targets unless these models provide some information or make 
some presuppositions concerning such targets. 
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Faced with these claims, a proponent of LMM might note that 
credibility judgments “are often elicited solely through consideration of 
imaginary worlds” (Grüne-Yanoff, 2009, 94). In particular, she might 
observe that judging a model to be credible does not require one to 
demonstrate this model’s putative similarity, isomorphism, 
resemblance, etc. to any specific real-world target (ibid., 95). Even so, 
the point remains that some information or presupposition about real-
world targets is needed if one is to justifiably take facts about the 
possible worlds posited by a credible model to stand for putative facts 
about such targets. In this respect, it is telling that several modellers 
supplement their credibility judgments with empirical illustrations or 
‘stories’ that purport to explicate how the entities and mechanisms 
posited by their models may be taken to operate in the real-world 
situations they target (see e.g. Morgan, 2001). In fact, various authors 
maintain that grounding informative inferences from the world of a 
model to the real world requires significant similarities (see e.g. 
Sugden, 2000) or resemblances (see e.g. Mäki, 2009) between such 
worlds. 
 
These considerations have far-reaching implications for the merits of 
LMM. To illustrate this, recall that minimal models are assumed to 
“lack any similarity, isomorphism or resemblance relation to the world, 
[be] unconstrained by natural laws or structural identity, and [isolate 
no] real factors” (Grüne-Yanoff, 2009, 83). As this definition indicates, 
consideration of a minimal model can per se provide neither a priori nor 
empirical reasons to justifiably infer that what is possible (or necessary) 
in the worlds envisioned by such model is also possible (or necessary) 
in the real-world situations investigated by modellers. Therefore, 
justifiably inferring that the necessity and impossibility results of a 
minimal model hold also in the real-world situations investigated by 
modellers requires one to supplement this minimal model with some 
information or presuppositions concerning those situations. More 
generally, it appears that consideration of minimal models cannot 
prompt learning about real-world targets unless one supplements these 
models with additional information or presuppositions concerning such 
targets. 
 
I shall expand in the next section on prominent authors’ failure to 
demonstrate that consideration of at least some minimal models does 
per se prompt learning about real-world targets. For the purpose of this 
section, I consider one illustrative instance of putative learning from 
minimal models. In recent years, various agent-based models of asset 
pricing have been proposed to replicate a few so-called ‘stylised facts’ 
of finance, i.e. specific statistical properties of financial time series that 
seemingly persist across a range of time periods and assets (see e.g. 
LeBaron, 2006, on the fat-tailed distributions of returns and volatility 
clustering). Some of these models have been claimed to be minimal on 
the alleged grounds that they do not resemble particular real-world 
targets, do not aim to reproduce any actual time series in specific time 
intervals, and so on (see e.g. Casini, 2014, on Arthur et al., 1997, and 
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Lux and Marchesi, 1999). Those agent-based models of asset pricing 
purportedly undermine the necessity hypothesis that high price 
volatility necessarily results from external shocks by demonstrating that 
such volatility may emerge from the actions of heterogeneous traders 
even in the absence of external shocks.4 
 
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the aforementioned 
agent-based models of asset pricing may be plausibly regarded as 
minimal in the sense indicated by LMM. It is hard to see on what 
grounds these models’ possibility results may foster justified changes in 
confidence in hypotheses about real-world targets unless one provides 
convincing reasons or evidence (e.g. analogies with biological and 
physical systems, qualitative match with observed stock series) to think 
that what is possible (or necessary) in the worlds posited by such 
models is also possible (or necessary) in the targeted real-world 
situations. In this respect, one might well rebut that some agent-based 
models of asset pricing can prompt learning about real-world targets by 
drawing on implicit presuppositions or background information about 
these targets (see e.g. Alfi et al., 2009, on assumptions concerning the 
number of agents in the investigated markets). This rebuttal, however, 
would be of little help to the proponents of LMM. For it relinquishes 
the claim that these models are minimal in the sense indicated by LMM, 
and thereby prevents instances of learning from those models from 
providing support to LMM. 
 
A proponent of LMM might object that it would be exceedingly 
demanding to require her to specify in virtue of what properties or 
features minimal models can supposedly prompt learning about real-
world targets. After all, the objection would go, a wide range of 
properties and features may prompt learning in different modelling 
contexts. Furthermore, whether a given property or feature can prompt 
learning presumably depends on contextual factors such as modellers’ 
aims, what information they possess concerning the investigated targets, 
and so on. These considerations are not without merit, but do not 
exempt the proponents of LMM from the need to explicate in virtue of 
what properties or features minimal models can supposedly prompt 
learning. For the alleged context-dependency of what these properties 
or features are implies neither that any property or feature may enable 
learning nor that whether specific minimal models possess learning-
enabling properties or features is an arbitrary matter. 
                                                          
4  Some authors claim that learning from minimal models may go beyond 
undermining specific necessity or impossibility hypotheses (see e.g. Casini, 
2014, on the alleged provision of mechanistic insights about the examined 
targets). However, these authors typically adopt less restrictive 
characterizations of ‘minimal model’ than the characterization underlying 
LMM, since they allow that some world-linking relation may hold between 
what they call ‘minimal models’ and real-world targets (see e.g. Casini, 2014, 
660-662). For present purposes, I focus on the thesis that consideration of 
models that are minimal in the sense indicated by LMM can justifiably affect 
confidence in necessity or impossibility hypotheses. 
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A proponent of LMM might further object that scientific modellers 
occasionally take their models to prompt learning about real-world 
targets even in cases where the relation between such models and 
targets is uncertain or not univocally determined (see e.g. Grüne-
Yanoff, 2009, 83). Still, this objection does not license the claim that 
consideration of minimal models can per se prompt learning about real-
world targets. For minimal models are assumed to lack any similarity, 
isomorphism, resemblance, etc. relation to such targets, and the mere 
fact that modellers at a given time have not univocally determined what 
relation holds between a model and their real-world targets falls short of 
implying that such model is minimal in the sense indicated by LMM 
(e.g. modellers may subsequently succeed in determining what relation 
holds between their model and targets). 
 
Similarly, observing that scientific modellers do not generally specify 
what world-linking relation holds between their models and targets (see 
e.g. Grüne-Yanoff, 2009, 86) would hardly help the proponents of 
LMM. For this observation by no means implies that models can 
prompt learning about real-world targets in the absence of world-
linking relations. In particular, one can consistently maintain that 
different world-linking relations may enable a model to prompt learning 
about real-world targets, and yet insist that some such relation must 
hold for the model to prompt learning about those targets (see e.g. 
footnote no.1; see also Rohwer and Rice, 2013, for a discussion). 
 
At this stage, a proponent of LMM might concede that a literal 
interpretation of this thesis appears to be implausibly strong.5 At the 
same time, she might attempt to identify and substantiate a non-trivial 
reformulation of LMM. In the points 1.1 and 1.2 below, I consider and 
rebut two such purported reformulations in turn. 
 
 
1.1 Qualifying LMM 
 
The first reformulation holds that all LMM was meant to assert is 
simply that consideration of minimal models, supplemented with some 
additional information or presuppositions concerning real-world 
                                                          
5  Indeed, one might question whether many scientific models qualify as 
minimal in the sense indicated by LMM. After all, the thought would be, 
given a model and a putative target, one can almost invariably find some sort 
of similarity, isomorphism, resemblance, etc. between such model and target. I 
am not concerned here with assessing the cogency of this supposition. For the 
purpose of my critique, it suffices to note that if no model qualified as 
minimal in the sense indicated by LMM, then LMM would reduce to the 
vacuous conditional statement that if there were minimal models, then we 
could learn from such models. In this respect, the challenge for the proponents 
of LMM is to provide a reformulation of LMM that is neither vacuous in this 
sense nor trivial in the sense specified in the text (see my remarks on LMM* 
and LMM** below). 
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targets, can prompt learning about those targets. Let us call this 
assertion ‘LMM*’ so as to distinguish it from the stronger LMM. 6 
LMM* seems far less controversial than LMM. Regrettably, LMM* 
also seems to trivialize the question whether we can learn from minimal 
models, in the sense that it gives this question an answer that is 
straightforwardly determinable on the basis of our background 
knowledge or available evidence. After all, no sensible modellers would 
deny that consideration of minimal models - supplemented with 
suitably detailed information and presuppositions about real-world 
targets - can prompt learning about such targets. Moreover, if LMM* 
was all the proponents of LMM intended to show, then speaking of 
‘learning from minimal models’ would be quite misleading. For on 
LMM*, consideration of minimal models is said to prompt learning 
about real-world targets only in a rather indirect and derivative sense. 
 
Analogous remarks apply to the proposal to regard information from 
modellers’ context of inquiry as part of candidate minimal models on 
the alleged ground that models typically “consist of both a formal 
structure and an interpretation of this structure” (Grüne-Yanoff, 2009, 
84). More specifically, this proposal invites the following two-fold 
rejoinder. First, if information from modellers’ context of inquiry is 
considered part of a model, then it becomes highly dubious that this 
model can be plausibly deemed to be minimal in the sense indicated by 
LMM (e.g. such model may have significant similarity, isomorphism, 
resemblance, etc. relations to real-world targets). And second, 
redefining the notion of minimal model so that information from 
modellers’ context of inquiry counts as part of such model makes LMM 
vulnerable to trivialization in the sense explicated in the previous 
paragraph. 
 
 
1.2 Redefining the notion of minimal model 
 
The second reformulation of LMM, which draws on a redefinition of 
the notion of minimal model embedded in LMM, proceeds as follows. 
On a literal reading, LMM presupposes a narrow characterization of 
‘minimal model’, according to which only models that actually lack any 
resemblance, similarity, isomorphism, etc. relation to real-world targets 
count as minimal models. However, one might take the set of minimal 
models to include both models that actually lack any similarity, 
isomorphism, resemblance, etc. relation to real-world targets and 
models for which no relation of similarity, isomorphism, resemblance, 
etc. to specific real-world targets has been determined by modellers (see 
footnote no.2). Adopting this broader characterization of ‘minimal 
                                                          
6  I am not aware of authors who explicitly relinquish LMM to advocate 
LMM*. Grüne-Yanoff might be taken to speak in favour of LMM* when he 
observes (2009, 98) that minimal models do not support hypotheses about 
particular real-world situations without empirical information about the world 
(see also Grüne-Yanoff, 2013a). 
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model’, in turn, enables one to defend the claim that we can learn from 
minimal models (Grüne-Yanoff, personal correspondence). 
 
Does this reasoning point to a plausible and non-trivial reformulation of 
LMM? It does not seem so. To see this, suppose we take the set of 
minimal models to include both models that actually lack any 
similarity, isomorphism, resemblance, etc. relation to real-world targets 
and models for which no relation of similarity, isomorphism, 
resemblance, etc. to specific real-world targets has been determined by 
modellers. Let us call the claim that we can learn from minimal models 
defined in this broad sense ‘LMM**’. At first glance, LMM** might 
appear to constitute a plausible reformulation of LMM. However, 
LMM** also seems to trivialize the issue whether we can learn from 
minimal models, since it merely re-states well-known results in the 
epistemology of modelling. After all, modellers have reiterated for 
decades that models can prompt learning in cases where no 
resemblance, similarity, isomorphism, etc. relation to specific real-
world targets has been determined (see e.g. Fisher, 1930, on models of 
three-sexed sexually reproducing populations, and Weisberg, 2007b, on 
perpetual motion machines). 
 
Regrettably, several reformulations of LMM would count as trivial in 
this sense. For instance, consider the hypothetical reformulation of 
LMM as the thesis that highly idealized models can prompt learning 
about real-world targets. This reformulation of LMM trivializes the 
issue whether we can learn from minimal models by redefining the 
notion of minimal model in such a way that models that have already 
been shown to prompt learning about real-world targets (see e.g. Mäki, 
2005 and 2009, and Sugden, 2000 and 2009) count as ‘minimal models’. 
That is to say, while a literal reading of LMM seemingly fails to 
withstand scrutiny, the proponents of LMM have hitherto failed to 
identify and substantiate a non-trivial reformulation of such thesis. 
 
 
2.    Does consideration of some minimal models prompt learning? 
 
 
The critique articulated in Section 1 challenges the proponents of LMM 
to specify in virtue of what properties or features minimal models can 
supposedly prompt learning about real-world targets. In this section, I 
complement this challenge with two detailed cases studies to argue that 
consideration of minimal models cannot per se prompt learning about 
such targets. In particular, I aim to demonstrate that LMM falls prey to 
the following dilemma. On the one hand, truly minimal models - i.e. 
models that are minimal in the sense indicated by LMM - lack the 
evidential and epistemic resources to prompt learning about real-world 
targets. On the other hand, several models that prima facie seem 
minimal in the sense indicated by LMM can prompt learning about real-
world targets, but succeed in doing so only if supplemented with 
additional information or presuppositions about such targets. 
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In the points 2.1 and 2.2 below, I illustrate this dilemma with regard to 
two widely cited examples of purportedly minimal models, namely 
Schelling’s (1969, 1971, 1972, and 1978) checkerboard model of 
residential segregation and Maynard Smith and Parker’s (1976) Hawk-
Dove model of animal conflict. In each case, I first present the relevant 
model and explicate in what sense this model is claimed to prompt 
learning about real-world targets. I then argue that even these widely 
cited examples of putative learning from minimal models fail to support 
LMM.7 
 
 
2.1 Schelling’s checkerboard model  
 
Schelling’s checkerboard model is one of the most cited and discussed 
works in the philosophical literature on scientific modelling (see e.g. 
Aydinonat, 2007, Sugden, 2000, and Ylikoski and Aydinonat, 2014). 
Schelling presents his model as “an abstract exploration of some of the 
quantitative dynamics of segregating behaviour” which aims to 
elucidate “what kinds of segregation or integration may result from 
individual choice” (1971, 147-8). In particular, he purports to 
demonstrate that observable aggregate phenomena are “compatible with 
types of ‘molecular movement’ that do not closely resemble the 
aggregate outcomes that they determine” (1978, 152). This 
demonstration, in turn, allegedly vindicates the general principle that 
individuals’ interactions may lead to unintended and unexpected results 
in a wide range of settings (Schelling, 2006, ch.18).8 
 
In Schelling’s model, two types of tokens are initially distributed 
randomly over a checkerboard. These two types of tokens represent two 
types of individuals and the checkerboard represents a city divided into 
neighbourhoods. Schelling defines each individual’s neighbourhood as 
the set of grid elements adjacent to the cell occupied by the individual 
(Moore neighbourhood). Regarding the individuals’ types, Schelling 
contends that his ‘ultimate’ concern is segregation by ‘color’ in the 
United States (1971, 144). At the same time, he makes clear that his 
analysis “is so abstract that any twofold [exhaustive, and recognizable] 
distinction could constitute an interpretation - whites and blacks, boys 
and girls, officers and enlisted men, [etc.]” (ibid., 144). 
                                                          
7 I focus on these two models because the proponents of LMM have debated 
over the epistemic import of those models in great detail and have claimed 
such models to constitute “a good example” of how minimal models can 
prompt learning about real-world targets (see e.g. Grüne-Yanoff, 2009, 96, on 
Schelling’s model). My considerations hold mutatis mutandis for other 
instances of putative learning from minimal models (see e.g. Batterman and 
Rice, 2014, on Fisher’s model of the 1:1 sex ratio, and Knuuttila, 2009, on 
Tobin’s ultra-Keynesian model). 
8 In his works, Schelling presents several versions of the checkerboard model, 
which differ in various details (see e.g. Sugden, 2011). I shall expand on these 
differences whenever they are material to my critique of LMM. 
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The dynamics of Schelling’s model can be explicated as follows. 
Individuals sequentially choose to either remain in the same place or 
move to nearby unoccupied cells. Each individual’s decision depends 
on whether her preference to have more than a given proportion of 
neighbours of the same type as her is satisfied. If an individual’s 
preference about the composition of her neighbourhood is satisfied, 
then the individual remains where she is. Otherwise, the individual 
moves to the nearest unoccupied cell where her preference is satisfied. 
This sequence of decisions continues until all individuals’ preferences 
are satisfied. 
 
In his works, Schelling demonstrates that an abstract pattern of 
segregation - i.e. a pattern of segregation figuring in the possible worlds 
envisioned by his model - can emerge even from individuals’ mild 
preferences not to be in a minority in the neighbourhood they live in 
(e.g. Schelling, 1971, assumes that each individual remains in the same 
place if at least 30% of her neighbours are of the same type as her). 
After the publication of Schelling’s model, several studies (see e.g. 
Fossett and Dietrich, 2009, Pancs and Vriend, 2007, and Zhang, 2004) 
have documented the robustness of Schelling’s result across a wide 
range of modifications in his model (e.g. think of changes in 
neighbourhood sizes, spatial configurations, and individuals’ tolerance 
thresholds for individuals of a different type). In fact, recent studies 
have shown that segregation may emerge even in cases where 
individuals strictly prefer to live in diverse communities and be 
surrounded by agents of a different type (see e.g. Muldoon et al., 2012). 
 
Over the last few years, various proponents of LMM have claimed that 
Schelling’s model provides “a good example” of how minimal models 
can prompt learning about real-world targets (see e.g. Grüne-Yanoff, 
2009, 96). In their view, Schelling’s result undermines the belief that 
segregation is necessarily caused by explicitly racist preferences, 
thereby leading all those who endorsed such belief to justifiably reduce 
their confidence in it. This, in turn, constitutes learning in the sense 
indicated by LMM. Two questions regarding these authors’ claims 
should be carefully distinguished. First, is Schelling’s checkerboard 
model minimal in the sense indicated by LMM? And second, does 
consideration of this model (on the supposition that the model is 
minimal in such sense) prompt learning about real-world targets? Let us 
address these two questions in turn. 
 
Schelling’s checkerboard model does not directly represent an actual 
segregation process in any real-world city (see e.g. Rohwer and Rice, 
2013, 352). In particular, it disregards features that are commonly 
associated with real-world segregation processes (see e.g. Weisberg, 
2012, on interactions across neighbourhoods) and does not include 
well-known causes of real-world segregation (see e.g. Aydinonat, 2007, 
on interpersonal welfare differences). Still, it is questionable whether 
Schelling’s model is minimal in the sense indicated by LMM, i.e. 
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actually “lack[s] any similarity, isomorphism or resemblance relation to 
the world, [is] unconstrained by natural laws or structural identity, and 
[does not] isolate any real factors” (Grüne-Yanoff, 2009, 83). Indeed, 
there are various reasons to doubt that Schelling’s model is minimal in 
this sense. To give one example, the possible worlds envisioned by such 
model seem to resemble both real-world cities and real-world 
segregation processes in several respects, ranging from the 
checkerboard’s division into neighbourhoods to the dependency of 
individuals’ actions on whether their preferences are satisfied. 
 
These observations make it dubious that Schelling’s model is minimal 
in the sense indicated by LMM. Even so, a proponent of LMM might 
insist that Schelling himself deemed his model to be minimal in this 
sense. After all, the thought would be, Schelling “does not justify [his 
model’s assumptions] with reference to the real world at all” (Grüne-
Yanoff, 2009, 88). Moreover, “neither similarity, isolation nor 
conforming to regularity are explicit concerns in Schelling’s original 
paper” (ibid., 88). I am not concerned here with engaging in exegetical 
debates over Schelling’s interpretation of his model. For the purpose of 
my critique, I note that there are reasons to doubt that Schelling deemed 
his model to be minimal in the sense indicated by LMM. For instance, 
Schelling (1971) introduces the checkerboard model after presenting an 
even more idealized one-dimensional segregation model where coins 
are arrayed on a line (rather than a grid) and there are no empty spaces, 
so that when a coin moves, it places itself between two other coins 
without altering the ordering of any other coin (see e.g. Sugden, 2011). 
Furthermore, in later works Schelling supplements the checkerboard 
model with a discussion of real-world segregation processes that hints 
at putative similarities between his model and those processes (see e.g. 
Schelling, 1978 and 2006, ch.18). 
 
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that Schelling’s model is 
minimal in the sense indicated by LMM. Assume further that Schelling 
deemed his model to be minimal in this sense. According to some 
authors, Schelling’s demonstration that abstract segregation can emerge 
even from individuals’ mild discriminatory preferences prompts 
learning about real-world segregation processes in the sense indicated 
by LMM. Their reasoning goes as follows. When Schelling published 
his original model, “many people believed that segregation is 
necessarily [caused by] explicitly racist preferences” (Grüne-Yanoff, 
2009, 96). Schelling’s demonstration undermines this widely shared 
belief, thereby leading all those who held such belief to justifiably 
reduce their confidence in it. This, in turn, constitutes learning in the 
sense indicated by LMM. 
 
Does this reasoning show that consideration of Schelling’s model (on 
the supposition that this model is minimal) prompts learning about real-
world segregation processes? There are at least two reasons to doubt 
this. First, it is dubious that when Schelling published his original 
model many people believed that segregation is necessarily caused by 
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explicitly racist preferences. And second, Schelling’s demonstration 
that abstract segregation is not necessarily caused by explicitly racist 
preferences does not per se prompt justified changes in confidence in 
hypotheses about any real-world segregation process. Let me expand on 
these two issues. 
 
When Schelling published his original model, many people presumably 
believed that residential segregation is often - or even typically - caused 
by explicitly racist preferences. This, however, falls short of implying 
that many (or even some) people held the much stronger belief that 
segregation is necessarily caused by explicitly racist preferences. 
Moreover, it is dubious that this belief was widely held at the time 
Schelling published his model. For at that time several factors other 
than explicitly racist preferences were already well-known possible 
causes of segregation (see e.g. Schelling, 1969, on interpersonal welfare 
differences). Indeed, it is questionable whether Schelling’s result was 
altogether surprising for other modellers. For although the degree of 
segregation that emerges in this model is much higher than individuals’ 
preferences for homogeneity, individuals are still assumed to prefer 
some degree of homogeneity in their respective neighbourhoods 
(Muldoon et al., 2012). Taken together, these observations make it 
doubtful that the necessity hypothesis that is allegedly contradicted by 
Schelling’s model was widely endorsed at the time this model was 
published. 
 
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that when Schelling published 
his original model, many people believed that segregation is necessarily 
caused by explicitly racist preferences. Even this would fall short of 
implying that Schelling’s model (on the supposition that this model is 
minimal) prompts learning in the sense indicated by LMM. To be sure, 
Schelling’s demonstration that individuals’ mild discriminatory 
preferences can foster abstract segregation may prompt a justified 
change in confidence in hypotheses about the segregation processes 
figuring in the possible worlds envisioned by his model. This 
demonstration might be epistemically valuable to modellers, but does 
not imply a justified change in modellers’ confidence in hypotheses 
about any real-world segregation process (see Section 1). Therefore, 
such demonstration does not per se prompt learning in the sense 
indicated by LMM. 
 
In fact, it is hard to see on what basis one could justifiably take 
Schelling’s demonstration regarding abstract segregation to prompt 
learning about real-world segregation processes unless one supplements 
his model with additional information or presuppositions about such 
processes (e.g. that individuals live in neighbourhoods, that they are 
concerned about their neighbourhoods’ ethnic composition, etc.). As 
Sugden puts it, “suppose we read Schelling as claiming that if people 
lived in checkerboard cities, and if people came in just two colours, and 
if each person was content provided that at least a third of his 
neighbours were the same colour as him, and if..., and if... (going on to 
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list all the properties of the model), then cities would be racially 
segregated. That is not an empirical claim at all: it is a theorem” (2000, 
17). 
 
 
2.2 Maynard Smith and Parker’s Hawk-Dove model  
 
As to Maynard Smith and Parker’s Hawk-Dove model, the following 
remarks are in order. Biological modellers often envision highly 
idealized models to investigate necessity and impossibility hypotheses 
concerning biological patterns or features observed across 
heterogeneous real-world populations. One such biological pattern 
relates to conspecifics’ propensity to exercise restraint in combat (rather 
than fighting to death) when they compete for limited resources such as 
nesting sites and mating opportunities (see e.g. Maynard Smith and 
Price, 1973). Since the winners of these conflicts gain resources (e.g. 
territory and mates) that enable them to transmit genes to future 
generations at higher frequencies than the losers, adaptationist thinking 
predicts that individual-level selection would favour fierce physical 
combat. Hence, the thought would be, group-level selection is required 
to induce the often-observed pattern of restraint in combat (see e.g. 
Wynne-Edwards, 1963). 
 
In a pioneering work, Maynard Smith and Price (1973) combine game 
theoretic methods and computer simulation to investigate the necessity 
hypothesis that group-level selection is required to induce the often-
observed pattern of restraint in combat. Maynard Smith and Parker 
(1976) build on Maynard Smith and Price’s work to demonstrate that 
pace this necessity hypothesis, individual-level selection acting alone 
can lead to restraint in combat in a wide range of populations. More 
specifically, Maynard Smith and Parker present a ‘Hawk-Dove’ game-
theoretic model of recurrent, anonymous conflict between pairs of 
contestants that compete over an indivisible resource and are drawn at 
random from a large population. The model focuses on situations where 
the two contestants can rely on some commonly observable asymmetry 
between their positions to resolve their conflict without having to fight 
(see e.g. Sugden, 2011). 
 
In the basic Hawk-Dove model, there is a single asymmetry between 
contestants (e.g. ‘discoverer’ of the resource and ‘latecomer’), which is 
assumed to correlate neither with their fighting ability nor with the 
fitness payoffs of winning and losing the contested resource. Moreover, 
each contestant has just two available strategies, namely escalate until 
injured or until the opponent retreats (Hawk), and display and then 
retreat if the opponent escalates (Dove). Three kinds of interactions can 
occur within the model (Maynard Smith and Parker, 1976). When a 
Hawk interacts with another Hawk, each contestant has a 50% chance 
of winning the resource and a 50% chance of being injured. When a 
Hawk interacts with a Dove, the Hawk wins the resource and the Dove 
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retreats. When a Dove interacts with another Dove, each is equally 
likely to win the resource without having to fight.9 
 
The model has two evolutionarily stable strategies, namely ‘escalate if 
discoverer, retreat if latecomer’ and ‘retreat if discoverer, escalate if 
latecomer’ (Maynard Smith and Parker, 1976). Each of these 
evolutionarily stable strategies induces a conventional resolution of the 
conflict. The idea is that individual-level selection acting alone can lead 
to restraint in combat in hypothetical situations of animal conflict with 
common knowledge of an uncorrelated asymmetry and with the Hawk-
Dove model’s payoff structure (see e.g. Sugden, 2009). This result, in 
turn, allegedly undermines the necessity hypothesis that group-level 
selection is required to induce the often-observed real-world pattern of 
restraint in combat (see e.g. Maynard Smith and Parker, 1976, 171). As 
with Schelling’s checkerboard model, two issues are usefully 
distinguished. First, is the Hawk-Dove model plausibly regarded as 
minimal in the sense indicated by LMM? And second, does 
consideration of this model (on the supposition that the model is 
minimal in such sense) prompt learning about real-world targets? Let us 
consider these two issues in turn. 
 
The Hawk-Dove model makes several idealizations, including infinite 
population size, asexual reproduction and random pairing of contestants. 
Moreover, many of the features of the possible worlds posited by such 
model have no counterparts in any real-world population. For instance, 
the model implausibly assumes that the payoff structure remains 
constant across individuals and game iterations (see e.g. Sugden, 2011). 
Furthermore, the Hawk-Dove model’s assumption that the contestants’ 
asymmetry is completely uncorrelated with fighting ability and payoffs 
is almost invariably violated in real-world populations (see e.g. 
Maynard Smith and Parker, 1976, 159). Because of these idealizations, 
the Hawk-Dove model does not accurately represent the selection 
dynamics of any real-world population (see e.g. Rohwer and Rice, 
2013, 341). Yet, in spite of those idealizations, the Hawk-Dove model 
is not plausibly deemed to be minimal in the sense indicated by LMM. 
For example, the hypothetical populations envisioned by the model 
resemble real-world populations in their being composed by 
reproducing organisms whose interactions can critically affect their 
fitness. Moreover, Maynard Smith and Parker supplement their model 
with some empirical illustrations that hint at putative similarities 
between the model’s selection dynamics and the selection processes 
operating in real-world populations. 
 
                                                          
9 Maynard Smith and Price (1973) explore more complicated versions of the 
Hawk-Dove model, where individual contestants can adopt several different 
strategies and can modify their own behaviour in response to their opponent’s 
behaviour. I focus on the basic Hawk-Dove model because it constitutes a 
more plausible candidate minimal model than the more complicated versions 
explored by Maynard Smith and Price (1973). 
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Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the Hawk-Dove model is 
minimal in the sense indicated by LMM. Does consideration of this 
model (on the supposition that the model is minimal in such sense) 
prompt learning about real-world targets? It does not seem so. To see 
this, let us examine the Hawk-Dove model in greater detail. This model 
demonstrates that individual-level selection acting alone can lead to 
restraint in combat in hypothetical situations of animal conflict with 
common knowledge of an uncorrelated asymmetry and with the Hawk-
Dove payoff structure (see e.g. Sugden, 2009). This demonstration may 
prompt a justified change in modellers’ confidence in hypotheses about 
the patterns of restraint in combat figuring in the possible worlds 
posited by Maynard Smith and Parker. However, it does not per se 
constitute learning in the sense indicated by LMM, since it does not 
imply a justified change in confidence in hypotheses about any real-
world pattern of restraint in combat. Indeed, it is hard to see how 
consideration of the Hawk-Dove model (on the supposition that the 
model is minimal) could prompt learning about real-world populations 
unless this model is supplemented with additional information or 
presuppositions about such populations (see point 2.1 above for a 
similar remark about Schelling’s model).  
 
Three parallels between Schelling’s checkerboard model and Maynard 
Smith and Parker’s Hawk-Dove model are especially relevant for our 
appraisal of LMM. First, in both cases a highly idealized model that 
does not accurately represent any real-world target is employed with the 
aim to investigate necessity or impossibility hypotheses concerning a 
range of real-world targets (see e.g. Sugden, 2009). Second, in both 
cases consideration of the possible worlds envisioned by the examined 
model enables modellers to demonstrate that a particular process or 
factor (e.g. mild discriminatory preferences, individual-level selection) 
can generate the feature or pattern of interest (e.g. segregation processes, 
restraint in combat) in a range of hypothetical situations (see e.g. 
Rohwer and Rice, 2013). Finally, and crucially, in both cases calls in 
support of LMM fall prey to the following dilemma. Either the 
examined model is minimal in the sense indicated by LMM, in which 
case it lacks the evidential and epistemic resources to prompt learning 
about real-world targets. Or the model prima facie seems minimal in the 
sense indicated by LMM, but can prompt learning about real-world 
targets only if supplemented with additional information or 
presuppositions about such targets.  
 
 
3. Minimal models and the epistemology of scientific modelling 
 
 
Faced with the previous case studies, a proponent of LMM may 
acknowledge that often-quoted instances of putative learning from 
minimal models fail to support this thesis. In particular, she might 
concede that prominent calls in support of LMM are vulnerable to 
severe objections. Still, she might argue that in spite of these objections, 
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LMM remains a plausible thesis. The idea would be to show that 
consideration of minimal models can prompt learning about real-world 
targets even in cases where these models are not supplemented with 
additional information or presuppositions concerning such targets. In 
this section, I examine and refute three arguments one may put forward 
to defend LMM against my critique. I shall consider in turn the 
argument from how-possibly explanations, the argument from clusters 
of models, and the argument from heuristic applications. Each of these 
arguments purports to defend LMM by pointing to a particular way in 
which consideration of minimal models can allegedly prompt learning 
about real-world targets. For each argument, I extend the remarks in 
Fumagalli (2015) and illustrate how my critique of LMM bears on the 
wider debate on the epistemology of scientific modelling. 
 
 
3.1 Argument from how-possibly explanations  
 
In the philosophical literature on scientific modelling, a number of 
authors have contrasted how-actually explanations and how-possibly 
explanations (see e.g. Forber, 2010, and Reiner, 1993). This contrast 
can be explicated as follows. On the one hand, how-actually 
explanations purport to identify what events or factors in fact cause the 
occurrence or some specific properties of the investigated phenomena 
(e.g. what socio-economic factors cause segregation in a particular city, 
what selection dynamics cause restraint in combat in a specific 
population). On the other hand, how-possibly explanations merely aim 
to identify possible causes of those phenomena’s occurrence or 
properties.10 
 
The argument from how-possibly explanations builds on this distinction 
between how-actually and how-possibly explanations to put forward the 
following defence of LMM. Modellers are frequently unable to provide 
how-actually explanations of the phenomena they investigate, and rely 
on a menu of how-possibly explanations (see e.g. Ylikoski and 
Aydinonat, 2014, on economic models; see also Rohwer and Rice, 
2013, on biological models). Consideration of minimal models may 
enable modellers to identify formerly overlooked possible causes of the 
examined phenomena, thereby extending the set of how-possibly 
explanations on which they can rely. This contribution, in turn, may 
lead modellers to justifiably change their confidence in specific 
                                                          
10 The expression ‘how-possibly explanations’ was originally used by Dray 
(1957 and 1968) to indicate explanations that purport to account for how 
events whose occurrence was previously regarded as impossible could have 
occurred. Here I employ such expression to designate explanations that aim to 
identify possible causes of the examined phenomena, irrespective of whether 
the occurrence of these phenomena was previously regarded as impossible (for 
another characterization of how-possibly explanations that drops the 
presumption of impossibility, see e.g. Resnik, 1991; for a recent discussion of 
how-possibly explanations, see e.g. Bokulich, 2014, Forber, 2012 and Reydon, 
2012). 
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hypotheses about real-world targets. Hence, the argument goes, 
consideration of minimal models can prompt learning about such 
targets. 
 
To illustrate how this argument is supposed to substantiate LMM, let us 
consider again Schelling’s checkerboard model of segregation. As we 
have seen in Section 2, this model demonstrates that abstract 
segregation patterns - i.e. patterns of segregation figuring in the possible 
worlds envisioned by such model - can emerge even from individuals’ 
mild preferences not to be in a minority in the neighbourhood they live 
in. Individuals’ mild discriminatory preferences are unlikely to be the 
most prominent cause of real-world segregation processes. For in real-
world situations, segregation typically results from other factors such as 
organized discrimination and economic inequalities between distinct 
social groups (see e.g. Ylikoski and Aydinonat, 2014). Even so, 
individuals’ mild discriminatory preferences may foster real-world 
segregation when some other contributing factor (e.g. organized 
discrimination) is present and might arguably foster segregation even in 
the absence of other contributing factors. In light of these observations, 
a proponent of LMM might contend that Schelling’s model identifies 
one previously overlooked possible cause of segregation and thereby 
extends the set of how-possibly explanations of real-world segregation 
that are available to modellers (see e.g. Grüne-Yanoff, 2013b). Let us 
assess the cogency of this contention.11 
 
Suppose that Schelling’s model extends the set of available how-
possibly explanations of segregation by identifying one previously 
overlooked possible cause of abstract segregation. This contribution 
may be epistemically valuable to modellers (see e.g. Sugden, 2000 and 
2009). However, it does not per se foster justified changes in 
confidence in hypotheses concerning real-world segregation processes. 
To be sure, modellers may occasionally be able to demonstrate that the 
possible cause of abstract segregation identified by Schelling’s model 
can foster segregation also in the real-world situations they investigate 
(e.g. think of cases where independent studies provide modellers with 
this information). Still, on the supposition that Schelling’s model is 
minimal, this demonstration would require modellers to supplement 
such model with information or presuppositions regarding those real-
world situations (see Section 2). More generally, it remains difficult to 
see how exactly consideration of a minimal model could enable one to 
establish that what counts as a possible cause of a phenomenon in the 
                                                          
11  Rohwer and Rice (2013, 341 and 349) put forward similar remarks 
concerning Maynard Smith and Parker’s (1976) Hawk-Dove model of animal 
conflict. However, Rohwer and Rice adopt a less restrictive characterization of 
‘minimal model’ than the characterization underlying LMM, since they allow 
that some world-linking relation may hold between what they call ‘minimal 
models’ and real-world targets (see e.g. Rohwer and Rice, 2013, 347). Hence, 
their calls for the possibility of learning from minimal models do not directly 
support LMM, and my critique of LMM does not directly apply to such calls 
(see footnote no.13 for a similar point about Batterman and Rice, 2014). 
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possible worlds posited by this model is a possible cause of such 
phenomenon also in real-world situations unless one supplements the 
examined model with additional information or presuppositions about 
those situations. 
 
At this stage, a proponent of LMM might conjecture that consideration 
of minimal models can prompt learning by providing partial 
explanations of the examined real-world phenomena, i.e. by identifying 
only a subset of the factors that account for the occurrence or specific 
properties of those phenomena (see e.g. Hempel, 1962). Regrettably, 
consideration of models that are minimal in the sense indicated by 
LMM cannot per se show that the factors figuring in the associated 
partial explanations can plausibly account for the occurrence or the 
properties of the examined real-world phenomena. For these models 
lack the evidential and epistemic resources to prompt learning about 
such phenomena. This does not imply that prompting learning about 
real-world targets requires modellers to accurately represent the 
behaviour and the properties of these targets. Still, the point remains 
that some world-linking relation must hold between a model and real-
world targets if consideration of this model is to prompt learning about 
such targets. To put it differently, putative partial explanations based 
solely on minimal models cannot foster justified changes in confidence 
in hypotheses about real-world targets in the absence of information or 
presuppositions about such targets. 
 
 
3.2 Argument from clusters of models 
 
Over the last few decades, most contributions to the philosophical 
debate on the epistemic import of scientific models have focused on 
individual models and the relationship between individual models and 
their targets. These contributions aim to explicate in virtue of what 
properties or features individual models can represent their targets and 
what conditions these models must satisfy to prompt learning about 
such targets. In recent years, various authors have criticized this focus 
on individual models. In particular, some have argued that the epistemic 
import of scientific models is best understood with reference to clusters 
of models relevant to the modellers’ aims (see e.g. Godfrey-Smith, 
2006, and Weisberg, 2007a). In their view, scientific modellers 
frequently rely on clusters of models to learn about their targets, and 
“one cannot fully appreciate the epistemic import of such models by 
way of singling out one model from this cluster […] and analyzing it in 
isolation” (Ylikoski and Aydinonat, 2014, 22).12 
 
The argument from clusters of models builds on these considerations to 
                                                          
12  The expression that models ‘come into clusters’ has been employed in 
different senses by scientific modellers. Below I use this expression to indicate 
situations where modellers’ predictive and explanatory goals are best achieved 
by using a combination of structurally dissimilar models. 
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demonstrate that even if individual minimal models fail to prompt 
learning about real-world targets, clusters of minimal models can 
prompt such learning by showing that the implications of specific 
minimal models can be derived by means of several independent 
assumptions. To see how consideration of a cluster of minimal models 
is supposed to prompt learning about real-world targets, let us examine 
again Schelling’s checkerboard model of segregation. As noted in 
Section 2, Schelling’s result that an abstract pattern of segregation can 
emerge from individuals’ mild discriminatory preferences holds across 
a number of modifications in Schelling’s model (e.g. changes in 
neighbourhood sizes, spatial configurations, and individuals’ tolerance 
thresholds for individuals of a different type). This demonstration points 
to the so-called ‘derivational robustness’ of models’ implications, i.e. 
the degree to which these implications hold under variations in the 
assumptions used to derive them (Woodward, 2006). Let me expand on 
this notion. 
 
Scientific modellers often construct models having different auxiliary 
assumptions with the aim to determine whether these models’ 
implications hold across dissimilar modelling contexts. This robustness 
analysis can help modellers to identify which auxiliary assumptions 
affect their models’ implications and determine what difference these 
assumptions make to those implications. In the philosophical literature 
on scientific modelling, various authors take the demonstration that a 
model’s implications are derivationally robust to provide some form of 
epistemic support to such implications (see e.g. Levins, 1966, and 
Weisberg, 2006). In particular, some note that models’ implications 
frequently rest on unrealistic assumptions and hold that derivational 
robustness analysis can justifiably increase modellers’ confidence in the 
robust theorems which connect these assumptions to specific modelling 
results (see e.g. Kuorikoski et al., 2010 and 2012). A proponent of 
LMM may draw on these contributions to argue that scientific 
modellers can justifiably increase their confidence in hypotheses about 
real-world targets by relying on clusters of minimal models.13 
 
Let us grant that scientific modellers can justifiably increase their 
confidence in hypotheses about real-world targets by relying on clusters 
of models, as opposed to individual models. Even so, appealing to 
                                                          
13 Batterman and Rice emphasize a similar point when they claim that minimal 
models can be used to explain why classes of heterogeneous target systems 
display the same large-scale behavior “by demonstrating that the details that 
distinguish the model system and [the target] systems are irrelevant” (2014, 
350). However, Batterman and Rice adopt a less restrictive characterization of 
‘minimal model’ than the characterization underlying LMM, since they allow 
that some world-linking relation may hold between what they call ‘minimal 
models’ and real-world targets (see e.g. Batterman and Rice, 2014, 355). 
Hence, their calls for the possibility of learning from minimal models do not 
directly support LMM, and my critique of LMM does not directly apply to 
such calls (see footnote no.11 for a similar point about Rohwer and Rice, 
2013). 
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derivational robustness does not per se provide a convincing defence of 
LMM. To illustrate this, imagine facing a situation where modellers 
rely on a cluster of models that are minimal in the sense indicated by 
LMM, i.e. a cluster of models each of which “lack[s] any similarity, 
isomorphism or resemblance relation to the world, [is] unconstrained by 
natural laws or structural identity, and [does not isolate] any real 
factors” (Grüne-Yanoff, 2009, 83). 
 
Consideration of a cluster of models that are minimal in this sense may 
prompt justified changes in modellers’ confidence in hypotheses 
concerning the possible worlds posited by these models. Nonetheless, it 
cannot prompt justified changes in modellers’ confidence in hypotheses 
concerning real-world targets unless one supplements at least some of 
these models with additional information or presuppositions about such 
targets. For consideration of models that are minimal in the sense 
indicated by LMM cannot per se justifiably increase modellers’ 
confidence that the results obtained in the possible worlds posited by 
such models hold also in the real-world situations they target (see 
Section 1; see also Kuorikoski and Lehtinen, 2009, 127, for a similar 
remark about results derived from clusters of models that rest on wholly 
unrealistic assumptions). 
 
 
3.3 Argument from heuristic applications 
 
The argument from heuristic applications purports to defend LMM by 
contrasting two distinct ways in which consideration of minimal models 
can putatively prompt learning about real-world targets. The argument 
can be articulated as follows. Suppose that the proponents of LMM fail 
to identify plausible cases where consideration of minimal models 
directly prompts justified changes in confidence in hypotheses about 
real-world targets. This would cast doubt on several calls in support of 
LMM, but would fall short of undermining LMM. For minimal models 
have many informative heuristic applications, in the sense that they 
inspire novel hypotheses about modellers’ targets and suggest more 
precise formulations of former hypotheses about such targets (see e.g. 
Grüne-Yanoff, 2013b). These heuristic applications, in turn, could 
indirectly foster justified changes in confidence in hypotheses about 
real-world targets (e.g. consideration of minimal models may lead 
modellers to form novel beliefs about real-world targets, which in turn 
challenge specific hypotheses concerning such targets). Hence, the 
argument goes, consideration of minimal models can prompt learning 
about real-world targets even in cases where these models are not 
supplemented with additional information or presuppositions 
concerning such targets. 
 
There are at least two reasons to doubt that this argument provides a 
convincing defence of LMM. First, it is often difficult for modellers to 
demonstrate that a model actually inspires novel hypotheses about their 
targets and suggests more precise formulations of former hypotheses 
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about such targets (see e.g. Schulz, 2012, on how pointing to trivial 
reformulations of previous hypotheses does not license the claim that 
one’s model has informative heuristic applications). And second, 
showing that consideration of minimal models occasionally inspires 
novel hypotheses about modellers’ targets and suggests more precise 
formulations of former hypotheses about such targets does not per se 
provide a convincing defence of LMM. For neither inspiring novel 
hypotheses nor suggesting more precise formulations of former 
hypotheses per se constitutes learning in the sense indicated by LMM.14 
 
At this stage, a proponent of LMM may well rebut that heuristic 
applications of minimal models can foster justified changes in 
confidence in hypotheses concerning the possible worlds posited by 
such models (see e.g. Schlimm, 2009, on how the existence of 
mathematical models can demonstrate the internal consistency of 
hypotheses that were formerly deemed to be impossible on a priori 
grounds). This rebuttal, however, would hardly help the proponents of 
LMM to substantiate this thesis. For heuristic applications based solely 
on minimal models cannot prompt justified changes in confidence in 
hypotheses about real-world targets in the absence of information or 
presuppositions concerning how the possible worlds posited by those 
models are related to such targets (see Pincock, 2012, 489, for a similar 
remark regarding mathematical models of biological patterns). To put it 
differently, heuristic applications based solely on minimal models lack 
the evidential and epistemic resources to prompt learning about real-
world targets unless one supplements the minimal models on which 
these heuristic applications are based (or those heuristic applications 
themselves) with additional information or presuppositions concerning 
such targets. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In the recent literature on the epistemology of scientific modelling, 
several authors have claimed that highly idealized scientific models can 
prompt learning about real-world targets. In particular, some have 
maintained that consideration of minimal models can provide modellers 
with epistemically informative insights about the possible worlds 
posited by such models. These two claims have attracted increasing 
consensus among philosophers of science, but fall short of licensing the 
stronger ‘LMM’ thesis that consideration of minimal models can per se 
prompt learning about real-world targets. The proponents of LMM have 
hitherto failed to provide convincing support to this thesis. Indeed, 
                                                          
14  As Grüne-Yanoff puts it: “if model use merely contributes to the 
formulation of [a] hypothesis, then no learning takes place. Learning requires 
that the model effects justified changes of our confidence in the hypothesis, or 
if the model itself gave rise to its formulation that it forces us to form a belief 
about this newly-formulated hypothesis based on consideration of the model 
itself” (2009, 85). 
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LMM itself appears to substantially overstate the epistemic import of 
minimal models even with regard to widely cited examples of putative 
learning from minimal models. That is to say, contra LMM, 
consideration of minimal models cannot prompt learning about real-
world targets unless one supplements these models with additional 
information or presuppositions concerning such targets. 
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